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RESCUING ACCESS TO PATENTED 
ESSENTIAL MEDICINES: PHARMACEUTICAL 
COMPANIES AS TORTFEASORS 
Under the Prevented Rescue Tort Theory 
R. Cameron Gower* 
ABSTRACT 
Despite some difficulties, state tort law can be argued to create a 
unique exception to patent law.  Specifically, the prevented rescue doctrine 
suggests that charities and others can circumvent patents on certain critical 
medications when such actions are necessary to save individuals from 
death or serious harm.  Although this Article finds that the prevented 
rescue tort doctrines is preempted by federal patent law, all hope is not lost.  
A federal substantive due process claim may be brought that uses the 
common law to demonstrate a fundamental right that has long been 
protected by our Nation’s legal traditions.  Moreover, this Article argues 
that even if this legal argument for such an exception ultimately fails, the 
near success of the argument should give us pause to think about whether 
patent law should be so untouchable that lives must be lost just to uphold it. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Every year many Americans are unable to access essential medicines.1  
Some are lucky enough to have limited access, but even “[m]any [of those] 
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1. Ann Carrns, Many Struggling With Prescription Drug Costs, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 
13, 2012), http://bucks.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/09/13/many-struggling-with-
prescription-drug-costs/ (“Consumer Reports’ annual prescription drug poll finds 
that more Americans who lack a drug benefit are failing to fill prescriptions 
because of cost.  Almost half of Americans (45 percent) under 65 who lack drug 
coverage failed to fill a prescription because of cost, the report found—up from 
27 percent last year.”); see also Peter B. Bach, et al., In Cancer Care, Cost 
Matters, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2012, at A25 (“In 2006, one-quarter of cancer 
patients reported that they had used up all or most of their savings paying for care 
. . . .  2 percent of cancer patients were driven into bankruptcy . . . , and [o]ne in 
10 cancer patients now reports spending more than $18,000 out of pocket on 
care.”).  
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people, especially retirees with chronic illnesses, have long resorted to 
splitting pills to help control escalating drug prices.”2  Fortunately, the 
problem in America far milder than that in developing countries.3  
Nonetheless, those without essential medication and those who are under-
medicated because of the high cost of drugs do not deserve to be ignored.   
Most people sympathize with those that are too poor to afford essential 
medications, but commentators rarely claim that the drug companies are 
committing some legally actionable tort against those poor patients.  Still, 
pharmaceutical companies are potentially subject to a tort claim for their 
use of patents to prevent access to essential medicines.4  This Note will 
focus on  whether drug companies can be liable under the common law tort 
claim of preventing a rescue that would otherwise take place.5 
Although commentators have considered the application of the 
common law doctrine concerning prevented rescues to pharmaceutical 
companies,6 the analysis is brief and lacks a discussion of defenses.  This 
Note expands the analysis by exploring the viability of a prevented rescue 
claim against a pharmaceutical company and the affirmative defenses that 
pharmaceutical companies might raise.7 
 
2. Vivian Marino, To Make a Pill More Affordable, Cut It in Half, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
13, 2004, at G10. 
3. See Donald G. McNeil, Jr., At Front Lines, AIDS War is Falling Apart, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 10, 2010, at A1 (stating that Uganda clinics turn people away and 
suggesting that other developing countries will soon do the same because of lack 
of funds). 
4. One other claim that applies to pharmaceutical companies results from the special 
relationship between the companies and those in need. Drug companies receive 
significant public aid in for research, and this funding creates a special 
relationship between the parties that overrides the general common law rule that 
parties have no affirmative duty to rescue. See Kevin Outterson & Donald W. 
Light, Global Pharmaceutical Markets 15–16 (Boston Univ. Sch. of Law, 
Working Paper No. 10-05, 2010) (“The duty to rescue is more salient when the 
bystander has received public support for the task . . . [therefore] pharmaceutical 
research programs that received public support should be under a similar duty.”). 
But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A (1965) (suggesting companies 
receiving public aid have no affirmative duty to rescue); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF TORTS § 40 (suggesting companies receiving public aid have no affirmative 
duty to rescue). 
5. See infra Part II. 
6. See Outterson & Light, supra note 4, at 14–16. 
7. Robert A. Schwartz, The Drug Company Blame Game, THE LEGAL NEWSLETTER 
(Aug. 16, 2012, 2:19 PM), http://www.thelegalnewsletter.com/?p=1041 (“drug 
companies love these affirmative defenses . . . which often include . . . the lawsuit 
fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; was not filed within the 
time allowed by that state’s law to file a lawsuit for personal injuries; was filed in 
the wrong court; is barred by the a doctrine called the ‘learned intermediary’ or 
‘sophisticated user’ defense; the [plaintiff’s] injuries . . . were caused by the 
[plaintiff’s] own negligence; the tort law claim is preempted by federal law; the 
drug was unavoidably unsafe; the drug was reasonably safe for its normal and 
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State tort law arguably creates a unique exception to patent law.  Tort 
law suggests that charities and others can circumvent patents on certain 
critical medications when such actions are necessary to save individuals 
from death or serious harm.8  This Note concludes that such a prevented 
rescue claim is preempted by federal patent law.  However, relying on the 
common law, the indigent might have a federal substantive due process 
claim.  Finally, even if the due process claim fails, the legislature should 
act to create an exception in patent law. 
Part I of this Note sets forth the tort law applicable to patent 
infringement.  Part II applies that tort law to the actions of drug companies 
that use their patents to prevent the poor from accessing medicine.  Part III 
explores alternatives to a state tort claim and considers the public policy 
implications of a system in which one of those alternatives is implemented. 
I. PREVENTED RESCUE THEORY AND ITS APPLICABILITY TO 
PATENT INFRINGEMENT 
Although distinct, tort and patent law overlap and conflict.  This Part 
considers the tort claim pertaining to prevented rescues and that claim 
might apply to the actions of a patent owner.  Section A discusses claims 
that a plaintiff may bring against a patent owner whose use of patents 
prevents the plaintiff from accessing patented inventions.  Section B 
considers the defenses available to those patent owners.  This Part is not 
meant to address how tort law might apply to any specific patent owner’s 
actions; instead, the application is explored in Parts II and III. 
A. Prevented Rescue Tortfeasors and Patent Enforcers 
In the United States, a person has no affirmative duty to rescue 
another.9  The classic hypothetical used to convey this idea supposes a 
person drowning and a busy passerby.10  Although many variations of this 
 
foreseeable use; or the [plaintiff’s] injuries were caused in whole or in part by the 
‘unforeseen alteration, unintended use, misuse or abuse of the drug”). 
8. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965) (“One who undertakes, 
gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another which he should 
recognize as necessary for the protection of the other’s person or things, is subject 
to liability to the other for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise 
reasonable case to perform his undertaking, if . . . (b) the harm is suffered because 
of the other’s reliance upon the undertaking.”).  
9. Id. § 314 (“The fact that the actor realizes or should realize that action on his part 
is necessary for another’s aid or protection does not of itself impose upon him a 
duty to take such action”); see also id. § 37 (“An actor whose conduct has not 
created a risk of physical or emotional harm to another has no duty of care to the 
other unless a court determines that one of the affirmative duties provided in §§ 
38-44 is applicable.”). 
10. Outterson & Light, supra note 4, at 6 (“One classic problem for first year law 
students is the person on a bridge who could save a drowning child by simply 
throwing a rope.”). 
Journal of Law, Technology & the Internet · Vol. 5 · 2014  
Rescuing Access to Patented Medicines  
28 
hypothetical exist, a common example includes a man crossing a bridge 
while running an errand.  As the man crosses the bridge, he notices a child 
drowning and a rope secured to the bridge that he could easily throw to the 
child.  Although no one else is nearby, the passerby decides to not throw 
the rope to the child.  The child drowns and her family sues the passerby.  
Although most Americans find it hard to believe, the passerby is not liable 
for the death of the child.11  Despite the minimal effort required, the 
passerby has no affirmative duty to save the child.12 
Given that people have no obligation to save those in need—even 
when the rescue would impose little to no burden on the rescuer—it is hard 
to imagine that patent owners could be liable for allowing the poor to go 
without a patented invention.  However, common law imposes certain rules 
that favor the poor.  For example, suppose that when the man crosses the 
bridge, he finds the same child drowning, but this time a rescuer is trying to 
use the rope to save the child.  In this case, the man is liable if he actively 
and intentionally prevents the rescuer from throwing the rope to the child.13 
Generally speaking, when a rescuer plans to rescue someone in need, it is a 
tortious act to interfere with that rescue.14 
The application of the Prevented Rescue doctrine to patent owners is 
now somewhat conceivable.  Patent owners who utilize patents to prevent 
third parties from rescuing those in need might be liable under the 
Prevented Rescue doctrine.15 
B. Control of Property Defense 
Defendants have several defenses available to combat a Prevented 
Rescue claim.  Defendants can argue that the Prevented Rescue theory is 
invalid when the defendant owns the tools used to conduct the rescue 
(“Control of Property Defense”).  Subsection 1 explains the argument, and 
Subsections 2 and 3 explain limitations on the Control of Property Defense: 
public and private necessity. 
 
11. Id. (“The common law is clear: a duty to rescue is not imposed, even if the rescue 
could be done easily with no risk.”). 
12. Id. (stating that it makes no difference how easy the rescue could be, an innocent 
passerby does not have an affirmative duty to take action). 
13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 326 (1965) (“One who intentionally prevents 
a third person from giving another aid necessary to prevent physical harm to him, 
is subject to liability for physical harm caused to the other be the absence of the 
aid which he has prevented the third person from giving.”). 
14. Id. § 327 (“One who knows or has reason to know that a third person is giving or 
is ready to give to another aid necessary to prevent physical harm to him, and 
negligently prevents or disables the third person from giving such aid is subject to 
liability for physical harm.”). 
15. See infra Parts II, III, and IV. 
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1. Basics of the Control of Property Defense 
The Control of Property Defense hinges on the nature of the rope at 
issue in the drowning child hypothetical.16  The Defense is raised when the 
defendant owns the right to control the tool used to rescue the person in 
danger.  Thus, this defense is relevant to all Prevented Rescue claims 
brought against patent owners17 but is also frequently relevant in non-patent 
cases.18 
The Control of Property Defense attempts to distinguish the patentee 
from the passerby that prevents the rescue.  The passerby in the earlier 
hypothetical does not own the rope that the rescuer attempted to use.  
However, if the Control of Property Defense is applicable, the passerby 
owns the rope.  Thus, a more applicable hypothetical has a passerby 
crossing the bridge with his own rope.  Meanwhile, a rescuer is trying to 
help the drowning child but has no rope.  After asking the passerby for his 
rope and being denied, the rescuer steals the passerby’s rope, which the 
rescuer-thief then uses to save the child.  The Control of Property Defense 
argues that property owner is guilty of no tort because he has the authority 
to prevent others from using the property. 
The validity of the Control of Property Defense is supported by the 
Restatement’s only illustration of the Prevented Rescue theory.19  The 
illustration suggests that the absence of rightful access can be fatal to a 
Prevented Rescue claim.20 The application of the Control of Property 
Defense is clear in patent actions.  Rescuers do not have rightful access to 
patented technologies because the patent owners have the right to exclude 
them from infringing.21 
 
16. See Outerson & Light, supra note 4, at 6 (hypothesizing that a busy passerby on a 
bridge sees a drowning child, fails to throw a rope to her, and she subsequently 
drowns). 
17. All patent owners have the Control of Property defense available to them because 
it is their nature as a patent owner that gives rise to the plaintiff’s claim in the first 
place.  Thus, by necessity defendants in patent cases own the tools used in the 
rescue. 
18. A defendant might assert a Control of Property Defense if the defendant owned 
the necessary property to rescue a person. 
19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 326 cmt. a, illus. 1 (1965). 
20. Id. (“A prevents the fire department from using a fireplug in front of A’s 
premises for the purpose of putting out a fire in B’s house.  This A does under an 
unfounded claim that he is entitled to the entire supply of water from the plug.  In 
consequence, the fire department is unable to put out the fire and B, while 
carefully attempting to rescue from his house some valuable chattels, is injured.  
A is subject to liability to B.” (emphasis added)).  The relevant aspect of this 
illustration is the sentence explaining that A is not entitled to the rescue tool, i.e., 
the entire supply of water from the plug.  This suggests that had A actually owned 
the entire water supply, B would have no claim against A. 
21. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006) (“[W]hoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, 
or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the 
United States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor, 
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2. Public Necessity Limitation 
The Control of Property Defense is limited by the tort doctrine of 
necessity.  Necessity establishes a broad range of circumstances that give 
an actor the privilege to use another’s property, despite the objections of 
the owner.22  If necessity applies, the owner of the rescue tool is not 
“entitled” to prevent the rescuer from using the tool.23  Two forms of 
necessity exist that can nullify the owner’s entitlement: public and 
private.24  This Subsection considers public necessity. 
The Restatement explains public necessity: “One is privileged to 
commit an act which would otherwise be a trespass to a chattel or a 
conversion25 if the act is or is reasonably believed to be necessary for the 
purpose of avoiding a public disaster.”26  Thus, someone acting with a 
public necessity has rightful access to any tools needed for the rescue.27  
The key, however, is that public necessity doctrine is concerned with 
preventing a “public disaster.”28  Naturally, determining whether an event 
qualifies as a public disaster requires an individualized analysis of state 
 
infringes the patent”); see also Rosenblatt et al., A Sleeping Tiger? Business 
Method Patent Protection for Franchise Systems, 22 FRANCHISE L.J. 9, 9 (2002) 
(stating that “a patent is a government-granted monopoly that allows the patent 
holder to exclude others from making, selling, offering for sale, or using the 
patented invention”). 
22. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 262–63 (1965). 
23. Id. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 890 (1977) (commenting that 
“nonconsensual privileges are given by the law for the protection of the interests 
of the actor, of third persons or of the public.”). 
24. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 262–63 (1965) (discussing “privilege 
created by public necessity” and “privilege created by private necessity” in 
regards to personal property).  In reality, one might say that there are four forms 
of necessity: two forms of public necessity and two forms of private necessity. 
See also id. §§196–97 (1965) (discussing further public and private necessity, 
respectively, as it applies to real property).  The bulk of this Note will focus on 
only one form of private and public necessity, the kind that applies to personal 
property.  Real property public and private necessity are not considered as another 
form of necessity in this Note for two reasons.  First, “land” clearly does not 
cover patents. See id. (The Restatement never clearly discusses patents in the 
context of land). Second, other than extending protection to land, real property 
necessity provides no noteworthy difference. Id. § 261 cmts. a-b (discussing how 
“the privilege stated in this Section is similar to the privilege to enter land in the 
possession of another for the same purpose as stated in §196 and § 197”). 
25. The Restatement identifies public necessity as applying to trespass to a “chattel” 
and conversion, which might be argued to not include patent infringement.  This 
argument is addressed in Part II.   
26. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 262 (1965). 
27. Id. §§ 262, 890 (“One who otherwise would be liable for a tort is not liable if he 
acts in pursuance of and within the limits of a privilege . . . .”). 
28. Id. § 262. 
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precedent and the facts of each circumstance.29  Thus, the remainder of 
public necessity is discussed below where public necessity is applied to 
specific factual situations.30 
3. Private Necessity Limitation 
In addition to public necessity, a privilege exists for private necessity.31  
Private necessity is explained in the Restatement: 
One is privileged to commit an act which would otherwise be a 
trespass to the chattel of another or a conversion of it, if it is or is 
reasonably believed to be reasonable and necessary to protect the person or 
property of the actor, the other or a third person from serious harm, unless 
the actor knows that the person for whose benefit he acts is unwilling that 
he shall do so.32 
Thus, someone acting with a private necessity has rightful access to the 
property of another.33 
Ploof v. Putnam illustrates the private necessity privilege.34  In Ploof, 
Ploof was sailing when a storm forced him to moor his boat to Putnam’s 
dock.35  Putnam objected to Ploof’s mooring and sent his servant to unmoor 
Ploof’s boat.36  The servant followed Putnam’s direction and Ploof’s ship 
floated out to sea where the storm severely damaged the ship.37  Claiming 
that he had a private necessity to moor his boat to the Putnam’s dock, Ploof 
sued Putman.38  The court agreed; Putnam was liable for the damages that 
arose because under the private necessity doctrine he was not entitled to 
unmoor Ploof’s ship.39 
The private necessity argument might function similarly in the tort-
patent setting.  If the infringer has a private necessity, she may argue that 
the patent owner has no authority to exclude her from utilizing the 
technology.  Exploring this argument any further requires a case-by-case 
analysis,40 which is found Part II below.41  There is, however, a unique 
 
29. See id. 
30. See infra Parts II.C.3, IV.A. 
31. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 263 (1965). 
32. Id. § 263(1). 
33. Id. § 890 (“One who otherwise would be liable for a tort is not liable if he acts in 
pursuance of and within the limits of a privilege . . . .”). 
34. Ploof v. Putnam, 81 Vt. 471, 71 A. 188, 189 (1908) (holding that private 
necessity can justify trespassing on another person’s personal property). 
35. Ploof, 71 A. at 189. 
36. Id.  
37. Id.  
38. Id.  
39. Id.  
40. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 263 cmt. d (1965) (describing the case-
specific balancing process required for private necessity analysis). 
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aspect of private necessity concerning damages that is worth mentioning 
here.42  The actor claiming private necessity while protecting her own 
interest or that of a third party is liable for “any harm caused by the 
exercise of the privilege.”43 
C. Preemption Defense 
In addition to the Control of Property Defense, tortfeasors subject to a 
Prevented Rescue claim may raise the Preemption Defense.  The 
Preemption Defense is relevant if federal law addresses the actions of the 
defendant.44  Under the defense, a defendant can argue that the plaintiff’s 
Prevented Rescue claim is preempted by federal law.45 
Because Prevented Rescue claims are rooted in state tort law, the 
Preemption Defense is successful if the federal law preempts a particular 
Prevented Rescue claim.46  Any further analysis of this defense, however, 
depends on which federal law the defendant asserts as part of its defense.47  
Thus, because the success of any particular Preemption Defense requires 
individualized analysis, the remaining analysis of the Preemption Defense 
is in Parts II, III, and IV below.48 
II. APPLYING A PREVENTED RESCUE CLAIM TO PATENTED 
ESSENTIAL MEDICINE MAKERS 
Because the success of a Prevented Rescue theory depends on the facts 
of a particular case, determining its viability requires individualized 
analysis.49  This Part considers how Prevented Rescue claims apply to 
owners of patents on essential medicines.  Section A provides context.  
Section B applies the prima facie argument for Prevented Rescue liability 
against the owners of patented essential medicines.  Section C considers the 
 
41. See infra Parts II.C.2, IV.A. 
42. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 263(2) (1965). 
43. Id. § 263 cmt. e. 
44. Gregory M. Dickinson, An Empirical Study of Obstacle Preemption in the 
Supreme Court, 89 NEB. L. REV. 682, 684–86 (2011) (discussing the Supreme 
Court’s unpredictable jurisprudence on preemption and defining the different 
types of federal preemption). 
45. Id. 
46. Richard C. Ausness, Preemption of State Tort Law by Federal Safety Statutes: 
Supreme Court Preemption Jurisprudence Since Cipollone, 92 KY. L.J. 913, 914 
(2004) (“[W]hen the federal government preempts state tort law doctrines, it ousts 
states from an area where they have historically exercised their police powers.”). 
47. See id. at 918–19 (discussing what type of law preemption should be analyzed 
under; the Supremacy Clause, the Commerce Clause, or the Necessary and Proper 
Clause). 
48. See discussion infra Part II, III, IV.A. 
49. See supra text accompanying notes 32, 52. 
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drug companies’ Control of Property Defense.  Lastly, Section D considers 
the drug companies Preemption Defense. 
A. Context and Definitions 
It is important to understand the concepts to which this Section and the 
rest of this Note refer.  The following definitions serve only to define how 
these terms are used in the remainder of this Note. 
Essential Medicines: medicines that save a person from otherwise 
certain death or serious bodily harm. 
Indigent Sick: a select group of poor people who currently do not have 
access to essential medications that they need but who would receive the 
medications—through charity or by purchasing them on their own—if 
patents did not allow the manufacturer to charge monopoly prices. 
Charities: charities which would provide essential medicines to the 
indigent sick if it were not for the existence of drug patents.  The charities 
could do so either through purchasing essential medicines at generic prices 
(perhaps from out of the country) or, conceivably, by manufacturing the 
essential medicines on their own.  This term could also be used to refer to 
any other person or group seeking to act in a similar way, such as a 
philanthropist or generic drug manufacturer. 
Drug Companies: drug companies that own the patent to an essential 
medicine that at least one indigent sick person needs and is not receiving. 
In the remainder of this note, the Prevented Rescue theory is used 
offensively by the indigent sick to establish a tort cause of action against 
certain drug companies.  The indigent sick bring a Prevented Rescue claim 
against a drug company under the theory that it used its patents in a way 
that either prevented a charity from providing the indigent sick with 
essential medicines or made those essential medicines so expensive that the 
indigent sick could not afford them.  The indigent sick may seek damages, 
but this Note is mainly concerned with whether an injunction would be 
granted.50 
B. Prima Facie Case for Drug Company Prevented Rescue Liability 
As mentioned in Part I, plaintiffs cannot assert a duty to rescue claim.51  
However, a Prevented Rescue claim is more plausible.52  This Section 
 
50. Another setting involves charities as defendants to a patent infringement claim.  
In this scenario, the charity provides essential medicines to the indigent sick.  In 
response, the drug company sues the charity for an injunction and damages.  In 
this case, the arguments addressed in this Note are used by the charities as a 
counterclaim or a defense against the drug companies. 
51. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 37 (2005) (stating there is no general duty 
to rescue when risk was not created by the actor); Id. § 314 (stating that an actor’s 
awareness of another’s need for “aid or protection does not of itself impose upon 
him a duty to take such action”). But see Outterson & Light, supra note 4, at 6-7 
(stating that special legal relationships or risk creation are exceptions to the 
common law concept of no general duty to rescue). 
52. See discussion supra Part I.A. 
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analyzes how the indigent sick might assert a Prevented Rescue claim 
against a drug company. 
A prima facie case asserting a Prevented Rescue claim against a drug 
company is fairly straightforward.  The argument is similar to the argument 
made in the bridge-rescue hypothetical discussed in Part I.53  Recall the 
passerby who terminated the rescue of a drowning child by preventing a 
rescuer from throwing a rope to the drowning child.54  In the drug context, 
the rescuer is the charity, the passerby is the drug company, the drowning 
child is the indigent sick, and the rope is the patented essential medicine. 
The analogy is clear: drug companies prevent generic drug 
manufacturers and charity groups from saving the indigent sick by 
threatening to sue anyone who manufactures or distributes infringing 
medicines, just as the man crossing the bridge prevents the rescuer from 
throwing a rope to the drowning child. 
Similarly, the argument can be made by plugging the appropriate 
words into the Restatement: drug companies “intentionally prevent[] 
[charity groups] from giving [the indigent sick] aid [in the form of generic 
essential medicines that are] necessary to prevent physical harm to [those 
indigent sick people.]”55  Thus, a drug company that uses a patent to 
prevent the indigent sick from accessing essential medicines must rely on 
an affirmative defense to preclude liability. 
C. Control of Property Defense 
The Control of Property Defense is a defense that every drug company 
can raise in response to a Prevented Rescue claim.56  Subsection 1 explains 
the drug company’s argument.  But Subsection 2 rejects—through the 
private necessity privilege—the defense.  And Subsection 3 rejects—
through public necessity—the defense. 
1. Applicability of the Control of Property Defense 
The Control of Property Defense is easily applied in the patent 
context.57  The drug companies can utilize the defense in the same way that 
the passerby whose rope was stolen to save the life a drowning child.58  In 
short, a drug company can argue that the charity did not have the right to 
rescue the indigent sick by infringing a patent.  Because the drug company 
 
53. See discussion supra Part I.A. 
54. See discussion supra Part I.A. 
55. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 326 (1965) (stating that “[o]ne who 
intentionally prevents a third person from giving to another aid necessary to 
prevent physical harm to him, is subject to liability for physical harm caused to 
the other by the absence of the aid which he has prevented the third person from 
giving.”). 
56. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2006) (codifying a patent holder’s right to exclude). 
57. See supra text accompanying note 16. 
58. See supra Part I.B. 
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owned the patent to the technology, no charity can infringe the patent 
without prior permission from the drug company.  As discussed above, if a 
defendant has the right to prevent access to the tools of rescue, a Prevented 
Rescue claim will fail.59  Nonetheless,  private and public necessity limit 
the Control of Property Defense. 
2. Limitations Created by Private Necessity 
The Control of Property Defense is limited by the doctrine of 
necessity.  This Subsection considers how private necessity might limit the 
extent to which drug companies can claim the Control of Property Defense. 
The drug companies’ use of the Control of Property Defense depends 
on the assertion that the charities have no rightful access to the essential 
medications that the indigent sick need.60  Clearly, patents give drug 
companies the right to exclude the charities from using the drug 
companies’ patented technology.61  Nonetheless, private necessity might 
give charities the privilege to use patented medications without the consent 
of the drug company.62 
To prove private necessity, the indigent sick need to show that a 
charity’s act of distributing patented essential medicines to them is “an act 
which would otherwise be a trespass to the chattel of [the drug company] 
or a conversion of it[, and that] it is or is reasonably believed to be 
reasonable and necessary to protect the person . . . [of the indigent sick] 
from serious harm.”63  This argument has two parts, and one is easily met.  
By their nature, essential medicines are—or, at a minimum, are reasonably 
believed to be—necessary to save the indigent sick from death or serious 
harm.64  Thus, the only remaining question is whether a charity’s patent 
infringement would constitute an act that “would otherwise be a trespass to 
the [drug company’s] chattel of or a conversion of it.”65 
Although this is not considered a textbook trespass to chattel or 
conversion, there is a strong argument that patent infringement constitutes 
 
59. See supra Part I.B.1; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 326 cmt. a, illus. 1 
(1965). 
60. See supra Part II.C.1. 
61. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2006) (granting patent holders the right to exclude); see also 
Gregory Rosenblatt, et al., supra note 25, at 9 (stating that “a patent is a 
government-granted monopoly that allows the patent holder to exclude others 
from making, selling, offering for sale, or using the patented invention”). 
62. See supra Part I.B.3. 
63. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 263(1) (1965) (stating that private necessity 
will not apply if “the actor knows that the person for whose benefit he acts is 
unwilling that he shall do so.”). This will clearly not be the circumstance in any 
case resembling those discussed in this Part. Any indigent sick person engaging in 
a lawsuit like the one discussed in this Part would only be doing so because she 
wanted the essential medicines made inaccessible to her by patent prices. 
64. See supra Part II.A. 
65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 263(1) (1965). 
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one or both of these torts.  The first issue to address is whether patents are 
considered “chattel.”  The answer appears to be “yes.”  Black’s Law 
Dictionary includes in its definition of personal chattel a “tangible good or 
an intangible right (such as a patent).”66  Moreover, the patent statute itself 
explains, with some limited but irrelevant exceptions, that “patents shall 
have the attributes of personal property,”67 and “the English word for 
personal property is ‘chattel.’”68  Thus, on at least two accounts it appears 
that patents do qualify as “chattel.”  
Having determined that patents qualify as chattel, it is important to 
consider whether patent infringement can be construed as a trespass to or 
conversion of chattel.69  Because almost all trespasses to chattel are 
conversions, most courts and commentators merely discuss conversion.70 
In court, the argument that patent infringement constitutes trespass to 
chattel or conversion has been made on several occasions.  Plaintiffs 
asserting this argument usually fail to win a judgment in state court, but 
rarely do they fail on the merits of the claim.71  As one court put it, 
“[b]ecause ‘[a] patent is a species of property[,]’ a patent holder not 
preempted under federal law may assert . . . conversion claims in state 
court.”72  Thus, courts have usually suggested that conversion extends to 
infringement, but it is preemption (and jurisdiction)73 that prevents most, 
but not all, plaintiffs from succeeding when making this argument.74 
 
66. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 268 (9th ed. 2009) (emphasis added). 
67. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2006). 
68. Dean Lueck, The Extermination and Conservation of the American Bison, 31 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 609, 642–43 (2002); Wesley D. Greenwell, State Immunity from 
Patent Infringement Lawsuits: Inverse Condemnation as an Alternative Remedy, 
63 S.C. L. REV. 975, 988 (2012) (stating that “[c]hattels include personal 
property”). 
69. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 263(1) (1965) (mentioning that private 
necessity will not apply if “the actor knows that the person for whose benefit he 
acts is unwilling that he shall do so.”). 
70. Paul M. Janicke, Implementing the “Adequate Remedy at Law” for Ongoing 
Patent Infringement After Ebay v. Mercexchange, 51 IDEA: INTELL. PROP. L. 
REV. 163, 178 (2011) (“The Restatement tells us that all but the most fleeting 
forms of trespass to chattels should be regarded as conversions.”). 
71. See, e.g., Fire ‘Em Up, Inc. v. Technocarb Equip. (2004) Ltd., 799 F. Supp. 2d 
846, 852 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (acknowledging that patent infringement claim was 
“improperly and redundantly cloaked as a conversion claim”); Miracle Boot 
Puller Co. v. Plastray Corp., 269 N.W.2d 496, 498 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978) 
(conceding that “the intangible right to benefit from a patent right can be 
converted,” but stating that the claim ultimately fails because “state court has no 
jurisdiction to resolve this dispute”). 
72. Jacobs Wind Elec. Co. v. Dep’t of Transp., 626 So. 2d 1333, 1337 (Fla. 1993). 
See also Sarver v. Detroit Edison Co., 571 N.W.2d 759, 762 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1997) (“[P]laintiff’s idea could be subject to conversion if she could establish an 
exclusive right of ownership in the idea.”). 
73. Preemption and jurisdiction are regularly conflated in the infringement-
conversion context. See, e.g., Jacobs Wind Elec. Co., 626 So. 2d at 1337 (finding 
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Many commentators have also noted that patent infringement is 
conversion.  However, state law does not protect these conversion claims 
due to preemption concerns.75  As explained by one commentator in 2012: 
[P]atent owners seeking redress in state court for unauthorized use of 
their inventions may try to establish trespass to chattels or conversion--state 
causes of action similar to a patent infringement lawsuit. 
Someone “who dispossesses another of a chattel . . . is liab[le] in 
trespass for the damage done” to the chattel or “for the loss of the value of 
its use.” If the dispossession is a serious interference with the owner’s right 
to control the chattel, the dispossession might rise to the level of 
conversion. Conversion and trespass to chattels are both based on the 
interference with possession of property, differing only in the seriousness 
of the interference and the available remedies. Chattels include personal 
property, such as a patent owner’s intangible right to exclude others from 
using its inventions. Therefore, ignoring jurisdiction concerns and 
 
jurisdiction after concluding that there was no preemption); Fire ‘Em Up, Inc. v. 
Technocarb Equip. (2004) Ltd., 799 F. Supp. 2d 846, 852 (N.D. Ill. 2011) 
(dismissing the plaintiff’s claim with ambiguous language that suggests either 
preemption or lack of jurisdiction); Greenwell, supra note 75, at 988 (mentioning 
preemption and lack of jurisdiction and analyzing each as one).  One reason for 
the confusion might be that the concepts usually stand or fall together.  
Jurisdiction is infrequently an issue in infringement-conversion cases because the 
plaintiff couples the state conversion claim with a patent infringement claim, 
which is the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal government.  28 U.S.C. § 1338 
(2006).  Preemption, on the other hand, exists where federal law occupies the 
field or conflicts with state tort law.  See infra text accompanying note.  Because 
federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over patent claims, conversion claims 
that are functionally identical to patent claims are preempted and the state court 
has no jurisdiction. 
74. See supra text accompanying notes 74–77 (discussing patent infringement as a 
form of conversion). See also Mannsfeld v. Evonik Degussa Corp., No. 10-0553-
WS-M, 2011 WL 53098, at *9 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 5, 2011) (explaining that “Federal 
patent law does not occupy exclusively the fields of . . . conversion law”). It is 
worth noting that the preemption issues discussed in this Section are different 
than those discussed in Part II.D.  Here, the preemption issue addressed is 
whether a patent infringement claim that is couched in terms of a trespass to 
chattel or conversion claim is preempted.  Preemption issues addressed outside of 
this Section are different in two ways: (1) they discuss whether a Prevented 
Rescue claim, not a conversion or trespass claim, is preempted, and (2) the 
potentially preempted claim is asserted against a patent owner, not by one.  See 
infra Part II.D. 
75. E.g., Greenwell, supra note 75, at 988 (stating that patent owners could establish 
state causes of action as trespass to chattel or conversion in connection with an 
infringement on a patent); Janicke, supra note 78, at 178 (“It does seem . . . that 
ongoing infringement can be a serious interference with the patent owner’s rights. 
The Restatement tells us that all but the most fleeting forms of trespass to chattels 
should be regarded as conversions.”); Ted D. Lee & Ann Livingston, The Road 
Less Traveled: State Court Resolution of Patent, Trademark, or Copyright 
Disputes, 19 St. Mary’s L.J. 703, 712 (1988) (explaining that “a claim for 
conversion of patent rights is equivalent to a patent infringement claim” but will 
not succeed because “state court has no jurisdiction”). 
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assuming the action is not preempted by federal law, a state court might 
view unauthorized use of a patented invention as a serious interference 
with the patent owner’s right to exclude, thus constituting a conversion.76 
As demonstrated by various courts and commentators, there is 
noticeable support for the idea that patent infringement constitutes 
conversion or trespass to chattel, even if non-merit-based issues usually 
preclude liability. 
Even though failure on non-merit-based grounds is relevant to a 
litigant, the result of litigation is irrelevant to the indigent sick and to the 
drug companies considered in this Note.  As was discussed above,77 the 
private necessity concern is whether a charity’s infringement “would 
otherwise be a trespass to the chattel of [the drug companies] or a 
conversion of it.”78  Importantly, the charity’s action constitutes conversion 
or trespass to chattel, even though the drug company would rarely be able 
to make the necessary preemption showings to prevail. 
Because state tort law varies, courts vary in their approaches to 
conversion and trespass to chattel.  For two reasons, not all courts have 
held that patent infringement constitutes a state tort.  First, some state 
courts refuse to recognize intangibles as chattel.79  Second, some courts 
reject the claim for the following reason: 
[Patents] exist[] solely because a federal statute memorialized an idea 
and thereby transformed it into intellectual property protected by federal 
law. In contrast, property that is typically the subject of a conversion or 
trespass to chattel action, whether tangible or intangible, exists 
independently (e.g., a house, a satellite signal, a customer list, etc.). 
Accordingly, . . . conversion and trespass to chattel counts [of this sort] fail 
to state a claim under [state tort] law . . . .80 
The rest of this Section will focus on those states where it is possible to 
state a patent infringement claim as trespass to chattel or conversion.  The 
analysis for the remaining states will resume in Part III below. 
In jurisdictions where it is possible to state a claim for patent 
infringement through trespass to chattel or conversion, charities would be 
 
76. Greenwell, supra note 75, at 988 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
77. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS) § 263(1) (1965).  
78. Id. 
79. See, e.g., Corporate Catering, Inc. v. Corporate Catering, LLC, No. M1997-
00230-COA-R3CV, 2001 WL 266041, at *5 (Tenn. App. Mar. 20, 2001) 
(“Although many jurisdictions hold otherwise, Tennessee is among the 
jurisdictions that have declined to recognize a civil cause of action for conversion 
of intangible personal property.”); see also, e.g., Lawson v. Commonwealth Land 
Title Ins. Co., 69 Md. App. 476, 480–81 (1986) (recognizing intangibles only 
insofar as they are tied to an otherwise converted tangible).  
80. Richmond v. Nat’l Inst. of Certified Estate Planners, No. 06 C 1032, 2006 WL 
2375454, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 15, 2006) (rejecting plaintiff’s attempt to combine 
“federal trademark law and Illinois law governing conversion and chattel . . .”). 
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trespassing to or converting patents.  Thus, the two aspects81 of private 
necessity have been proven: (1) the essential medicine is reasonably 
necessary to protect the indigent sick from serious harm, and (2) the 
charity’s provision of that medicine would otherwise constitute a trespass 
to, or conversion of, the drug company’s patent. 
Having concluded that charities have a private necessity privilege to 
distribute essential medicines to the indigent sick, the drug companies can 
no longer utilize the Control of Property Defense.  The Control of Property 
Defense hinges on the assertion that the charities do not have rightful 
access to the medications that the indigent sick need.82  However, because 
the charities have a private necessity, state tort law holds that they do have 
rightful access to the medications. 
Despite defeat of the Control of Property Defense, two private 
necessity issues remain.  First, drug companies can raise another defense.  
Section D below addresses other defenses.  Second, private necessity is not 
the best argument for the indigent sick to rely on.  Private necessity 
requires the party claiming the privilege to compensate the owner for “any 
harm caused by the exercise of the privilege.”83  Determining the harm 
caused by a charity’s distribution of essential medicines to the poor is not 
as easy as it sounds.  No court has answered this question, but there are two 
possible answers.  First, arguably, no damage is done because the indigent 
sick, by definition, could not have afforded the essential medicines.84  
Thus, the drug companies have lost no profit.  Alternatively, because of 
patent law guarantees patent owners nothing “less than a reasonable royalty 
for the use made of [the patentee’s] invention by [an] infringer,”85 a 
charity’s use of the patented technology entitles the drug companies to at 
least a reasonable royalty. 
Predicting whether a court would hold that the charity owes the drug 
companies a reasonable royalty or no compensation is tough.  In any case, 
the indigent sick would rather not run any risk, and would therefore prefer 
to defeat the Control of Property Defense with an argument that creates no 
chance of liability.  This argument is public necessity. 
3. Limitations Created by Public Necessity 
Like private necessity, public necessity limits the Control of Property 
Defense.  This Subpart considers how public necessity might limit the 
extent to which drug companies can claim the Control of Property Defense. 
To prove public necessity, the indigent sick must show that a charity’s 
act of distributing patented essential medicines to the indigent sick is “an 
 
81. See supra text accompanying notes 67-69 (discussing private necessity doctrine). 
82. See supra Part II.C.1 (discussing the control of property defense). 
83. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 263(2) (1965). 
84. See supra Part II.A (discussing the application of a prevented rescues claim to 
patent-holding essential medicine makers).  
85. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006). 
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act which would otherwise be a trespass to a chattel or a conversion . . . 
[and that] the act is or is reasonably believed to be necessary for the 
purpose of avoiding a public disaster.”86  This argument has two issues: (1) 
whether a charity’s patent infringement would constitute an act that “would 
otherwise be a trespass to chattel or a conversion” and (2) whether 
providing the indigent sick with essential medicines is an act that “is or is 
reasonably believed to be necessary for the purpose of avoiding a public 
disaster.” 87 
As part of the private necessity analysis, Subsection 2 addresses the 
trespass to chattel or conversion issue.88  Many states view patent 
infringement as a form of trespass to chattel or conversion, even though 
plaintiffs are rarely able to win their claims due to non-merit-based issues.89 
The second issue—whether the charity’s action is necessary for 
purposes of avoiding a public disaster—is more complicated than the first.  
By their nature, essential medicines are (or are at least reasonably believed 
to be) necessary to save the indigent sick from death or substantial harm.90  
Thus, the real concern is whether that rescue counts as an action that 
prevents a “public disaster.”91 
The Restatement does not define “public disaster.”92  However, the 
examples given in the comments are “a public enemy, . . . conflagration, 
flood, earthquake, [and] pestilence.”93  Thus, according to the Restatement, 
public disaster includes acting to prevent certain sicknesses.  The following 
illustration from the Restatement offers further clarification: 
A, [who is] an agister of cattle, kills B’s bull, which is in [B’s] 
possession, to prevent a spread of infection which is dangerous to other 
cattle and to human beings. If the act is reasonably necessary to prevent the 
spread of the disease, A is not liable to B.94 
Following this logic, the indigent sick that suffer from certain 
problems might be able to succeed in showing that the patented medicine is 
used to prevent a public disaster.  The argument’s success will vary based 
on the disease, with contagious diseases standing the best chance of 
qualifying as a public disaster.  Exploring each disease and the 
effectiveness of available medication is beyond the scope of this Note, but 
at least some medicines must be necessary to avoid a public disaster. 
 
86. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 262 (1965). 
87. Id. 
88. See supra Part II.C.2 (discussing the limitations created by private necessity). 
89. Id.  
90. See supra Part II.A (discussing the context of applying a prevented rescues claim 
to patented essential medicine makers). 
91. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 262 (1965). 
92. Id. § 262 cmt. b. 
93. Id. (emphasis added). 
94. Id. § 262 cmt. e, illus. 2. 
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Thus, public necessity supplements private necessity, and together, the 
two defeat the Control of Property Defense.  Drug companies cannot argue 
that they are entitled to prevent the indigent sick from accessing essential 
medicines unless they can claim that federal patent law overrides state tort 
law.  This argument is considered separately in the following Section. 
D. Preemption Defense 
Preemption is perhaps the most compelling defense that drug 
companies can assert.  The indigent sick’s argument rests on the claim that 
state tort law prevents drug companies from doing exactly what patents 
authorize the drug companies to do: prevent others from utilizing the 
patented technology.95  The following subsections consider two ways of 
preempting the Prevented Rescue claim: the Constitution and statutory 
patent law. 
1. Preempted by the Constitution 
“The Congress shall have power . . . [t]o promote the progress of 
science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and 
inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries . . . 
.”96  The plain language of the Constitution clearly confers authority upon 
the federal government to grant patents.97  If a state Prevented Rescue 
claim conflicts with the Constitution, the prevented rescue claim is 
preempted.98 
State tort claims that conflict with the Constitution are not new.  For 
example, in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court considered 
a state libel claim that conflicted with the First Amendment.99  As the Court 
explained, “[l]ibel can claim no talismanic immunity from constitutional 
limitations.  It must be measured by standards that satisfy the First 
Amendment.”100  Similarly, a Prevented Rescue cause of action can claim 
no magical immunity from constitutional limitations.101 
 
95. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006) (Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever 
without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, 
within the United States or imports into the United States any patented invention 
during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.”); Rosenblatt, et al., 
supra note 28, at 9 (stating that “a patent is a government-granted monopoly that 
allows the patent holder to exclude others from making, selling, offering for sale, 
or using the patented invention”). 
96. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. 
97. Id.  
98. Cf. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) (discussing the 
First Amendment’s preemption of a libel claim). 
99. New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 256. 
100. Id. 
101. Cf. id. (holding that a libel claim has no “talismanic” immunity from 
constitutional limitations). 
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Unlike the First Amendment, which guarantees free speech protection, 
the Copyright and Patent Clause merely grants Congress the authority to 
create patent law.  The clause fails to grant or guarantee any patent 
protection to inventors.102  Thus, the preemptive power of the First 
Amendment is not present in the Copyright and Patent Clause. 
2. Preempted by Statutory Patent Law 
Unlike the Constitution, statutory patent law preempts a Prevented 
Rescue claim.  Courts usually apply conflict, not field, preemption in the 
context of patent law,103 but the distinction is not important for this Note 
because the indigent sick’s Prevented Rescue claim directly conflicts with 
federal patent law. 
The court in Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc. explained 
conflict preemption law in the context of patents and state torts: 
To determine whether [] state law torts are in conflict with federal 
patent law and accordingly preempted, we assess a defendant’s allegedly 
tortious conduct. If a plaintiff bases its tort action on conduct that is 
protected or governed by federal patent law, then the plaintiff may not 
invoke the state law remedy, which must be preempted for conflict with 
federal patent law.104 
This rule clarifies the indigent sick’s Prevented Rescue claim is 
preempted.  The state tort claim is asserted against drug companies that are 
acting in a way that is protected by federal patent law.  However, the 
indigent sick might have a federal claim relates to a Prevented Rescue 
claim, which is what this Note considers next. 
 
102. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. 
103. Russo v. Ballard Medical Products, 550 F.3d 1004, 1011 (10th Cir. 2008) 
(reasoning that because Congress has not “evinced an intent to occupy 
exclusively the entire intellectual property field associated with inventions,” the 
“only concern in this case is thus narrowed to conflict preemption”); Ultra-
Precision Mfg., Ltd. v. Ford Motor Co., 411 F.3d 1369, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 
(“Because federal patent law does not provide explicit preemption . . . and 
because Congress does not intend to occupy exclusively the field of unjust 
enrichment law . . . we are concerned in this case with only conflict 
preemption.”); Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc., 153 F.3d 
1318, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (stating that “there is no reason to believe that the 
clear and manifest purpose of Congress was for federal patent law to occupy 
exclusively the field pertaining to state unfair competition law,” and concluding 
that “in conjunction with the underlying presumption disfavoring preemption, 
there is no field preemption of state unfair competition claims that rely on a 
substantial question of federal patent law”). 
104. Hunter Douglas, 153 F.3d at 1335; Midwest Indus., Inc. v. Karavan Trailers, Inc., 
175 F.3d 1356, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding that court will apply federal circuit 
law in determining whether patent law conflicts with other federal statutes or 
preempts state law causes of action). 
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III. RESCUING THE PREVENTED RESCUE CLAIM 
Statutory patent law preempts a Prevented Rescue claim brought by the 
indigent sick against drug companies that prevent access to essential 
medicines.105  Nonetheless, the indigent sick have two options.  The first is 
a similar claim brought under the federal Due Process Clause.  The second 
is through legislative action. 
A. Substantive Due Process 
The first method of saving the indigent sick is a federal claim (which is 
not subject to preemption): substantive due process.  Fully exploring the 
complexities of a substantive due process claim requires an article of its 
own, but one particularly relevant case cannot be overlooked. 
In 2007 and en banc, the D.C. Circuit decided Abigail Alliance for 
Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach on grounds that 
are highly relevant to the indigent sick’s Prevented Rescue theory.106  In 
von Eschenbach, the court considered a suit against the Food and Drug 
Administration by terminally ill patients seeking access to experimental 
drugs, which the FDA forbids.107  The FDA’s actions were similar to the 
actions of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office: both use their powers in a 
way that causes those in need to go without access to essential medicines.  
Thus, the decision in von Eschenbach is quite informative. 
von Eschenbach “beg[an], as [] in all due process cases, by examining 
our Nation’s history, legal traditions, and practices.”108  Highly relevant in 
this determination was two common law doctrines, “the doctrine of 
necessity [and] the tort of intentional interference with rescue;”109 i.e., 
necessity and Prevented Rescue. 
The plaintiffs in von Eschenbach argued (1) that some subset of the 
drugs they wished to take were capable of saving their lives and (2) that the 
FDA’s rules prevented doctors from using the drugs to rescue the 
patients.110  The plaintiffs did not believe that the FDA was liable for a state 
Prevented Rescue tort.111  Instead, they argued that Prevented Rescue tort 
shed light on our legal traditions and thereby supported a finding of a 
fundamental right,112 just like the common law tort of battery supported the 
Supreme Court’s holding of a fundamental right to refuse medical 
 
105. See supra Part II.D. 
106. See Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von 
Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695, 697 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
107. Id. 
108. Id. at 703. 
109. Id. at 707 (discussing common law self-defense). 
110. Id. at 707–10.  
111. Id. at 707. 
112. Id. 
Journal of Law, Technology & the Internet · Vol. 5 · 2014  
Rescuing Access to Patented Medicines  
44 
treatment in Cruzan.113  In von Eshenbach, the plaintiffs wanted the court 
to find a fundamental right to be free to ingest potentially life-saving 
medications when all other avenues of rescue had been exhausted.114 
Although the eight-judge majority held otherwise, the Prevented 
Rescue argument was accepted as a strong indicator of a fundamental right 
by two dissenting judges.115  Both the dissent and majority accepted that a 
valid Prevented Rescue claim would suggest a fundamental right, but the 
judges disagreed over whether Prevented Rescue theory applied.116  The 
crux of the dispute concerned whether the medications at issue were 
“necessary,”117 which, as discussed above, is needed to assert a successful 
Prevented Rescue claim.118  The majority felt that these medications were 
not “necessary” because they had not been shown to be anything other than 
“ineffective and unsafe.”119  The dissent vigorously disputed this argument, 
stating that the majority’s view was “manifestly flawed” in that it 
“confuse[d] what is necessary with what is sufficient.”120  To demonstrate 
the point, the dissent offered an example: “By the [majority]’s reasoning, it 
is not ‘necessary’ for the driver of a car that is hurtling toward a cliff to 
press the brake because we ‘cannot know until after’ he has done so 
whether the car will stop in time.”121 
Despite a bitter dispute over the “necessary” element of the Prevented 
Rescue theory in the experimental drug setting, there is no dispute over the 
necessity of the essential medicines that the indigent sick seek to sue 
over.122  Many essential medicines have already passed FDA approval and 
are proven effective.  Thus, given that the objections raised by the majority 
in von Eschenbach are inapplicable and that the only reasons for failure 
 
113. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990) 
(noting that informed consent, which is deeply rooted in our medical system, 
allows the patient the absolute right to refuse medical treatment). 
114. See Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 707. (“Such a right to self-preservation, the 
Alliance believes, would permit “persons in mortal peril to try to save their own 
lives, even if the chosen means would otherwise be illegal or involve enormous 
risks.”). 
115. Id. at 717–19 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for confusing what 
is necessary to save a patient’s life with what is sufficient to do the same). 
116. Id. at 718. 
117. Id. at 721 (reasoning that without access to these potentially life-saving 
medications, the patients will surely die; rendering the medications ‘necessary’). 
118. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 326 (1965). 
119. Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at n.15 (reasoning that until FDA trials are conducted 
on the experimental drugs at issue, there is no way to know if the drugs are safe; 
thus, they cannot be considered necessary). 
120. Id. at 719. 
121. Id. 
122. See supra text accompanying note 98. 
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found in this Note concerned preemption,123 there is good reason to believe 
that Prevented Rescue supports a finding of a fundamental right.  
Nonetheless, public and private necessity might further support the finding 
of a fundamental right. 
In addition to Prevented Rescue, the plaintiffs argued that necessity 
(either public or private)124 creates a fundamental right.125  Furthermore, 
they argues that their dire circumstances made their access to experimental 
medication a necessity.126 
Like the Prevented Rescue argument, the necessity argument was 
accepted as a strong indicator of a fundamental right by two dissenting 
judges and rejected by the eight-judge majority.127  Presumably, the 
majority could have held that the drugs were not “necessary,” but it chose 
to focus on a different point.128  The majority held that the plaintiffs’ 
argument provided only “little support” to the purposed right in the wake of 
Congress directly overriding the tort by statute.129  The dissent found that it 
was “true” that Congress can overrule the common law “but irrelevant” to a 
fundamental rights analysis.130  The dissent criticized the majority for 
ignoring the common law out of a fear of turning all of the common law 
into a fundamental right.131  Instead, the “tradition of protection does not 
 
123. See supra Part II (Part II “considers how Prevented Rescue claims apply to 
owners of patents on essential medicines” and Section D finds that the 
preemption defense is “the most compelling defense that drug companies have 
available to them.”). 
124. See Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 708–10 (the court did not distinguish between 
public and private necessity in its decision). 
125. Id. at 707–08 (“[T]he [plaintiffs] argu[e] that the concept[t] of . . . necessity . . . 
[is] broad enough to demonstrate the existence of [a] fundamental right . . . .”). 
126. Id. (“[Plaintiffs} argu[e] that . . . the doctrine of necessity . . . support[s] the 
recognition of a right to self-preservation . . . [Plaintiffs] believ[e] that a right to 
self-preservation would give the terminally ill a constitutionally protected right of 
access to experimental drugs.”).  
127. Id. at 717–19 (The dissent argues that the majority ignores the “core concerns” of 
the doctrine of necessity which include the “special importance of life and 
attempts to preserve it.”). 
128. Id. at 708 (failing to address the necessity argument entirely by stating that the 
“common law defense of necessity remains controversial and cannot override a 
value judgment already determined by the legislature . . .”). 
129. Id. (“Given the Supreme Court’s conclusion that the common law defense of 
necessity remains controversial and cannot override a value judgment already 
determined by the legislature, the common law doctrine of necessity provides 
little support to the Alliance’s proposed right.”). 
130. Id. at 718 (Aside from asserting that this case is not about efforts to preserve 
one’s life, but rather the ‘‘right to assume any level of risk,’’ the court further 
avoids the doctrines of self-defense and necessity by asserting that “Congress can 
override the common law.”). 
131. Id. (asserting that “recognizing that necessity has historically been protected does 
not constitutionalize the doctrine of necessity.”).  
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alone establish a fundamental right,” it is merely a factor for 
consideration.132 
The debate between the majority and dissent over the necessity 
argument applies just the same to the indigent sick and patented essential 
medicines.  Thus, although one circuit has held otherwise, other circuits 
might choose to side with the von Eschenbach dissent’s view. 
In conclusion, statutory patent law preempts the indigent sick from 
asserting a Prevented Rescue claim in state court.  However, the indigent 
sick might be able to use the same theory to establish a fundamental right 
to be free from the patent law restraints that prevent access to essential 
medicines.  Importantly, the answer will depend on the applicability of the 
Prevented Rescue and public and private necessity doctrines discussed in 
this Note. 
B. Legislative Action 
If all else fails, the indigent sick are left with only one option: rely on 
legislators to change patent law to allow for an exception in the case of 
charities and the indigent sick.  Unfortunately, the political will is unlikely 
to present itself in the near term, as the country is currently dealing with 
“fiscal cliff” problems and is in the middle of implementing a revolutionary 
new patent law.133  Nonetheless, the conflicting patent law and tort law 
discussed in this Note, along with near finding of a fundamental right 
should be taken by legislators as a reason for changing the current system.  
To more fully explore this question, though, some public policy 
considerations must be considered.  This Section briefly considers some 
obvious questions.  Will drug companies continue to develop essential 
medicines?  Are any other actors liable for preventing access to essential 
medicines?  Will other patent and intellectual property owners be forced to 
grant similar licenses? 
1. Implications for Other Patent and Intellectual Property Owners 
Parts II and III have explored the implications of the Prevented Rescue 
claim in the context of patented essential medicines and the indigent sick.  
This Subsection considers how far that analysis applies.  Can the plight of 
the indigent sick be generalized to other people that lack other technology. 
Much of the drug analysis in this Note is applicable beyond patents on 
essential medicines.  However, two important differences prevent the 
Prevented Rescue theory from being expanded much beyond essential 
medicines.  First, to defeat the Control of Property Defense, the indigent 
 
132. Id. (“A tradition of protection does not alone establish a fundamental right. The 
subsequent determination of whether a right is ‘‘implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty’’ invalidates the court’s fears of a slippery slope.”). 
133. See generally Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (setting 
forth new patent law that is split into two sections: Section 101, which relates to 
the  “subject matter for which patents may be obtained,” and Section 102, which 
defines “statutory novelty and states other conditions for patentability.”). 
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sick must rely on arguments that are not applicable far outside of essential 
medicines.  A defendant asserting the Control of Property Defense can 
argue that charities do not have rightful access to the essential medicines 
because patents give the drug companies the right to exclude the charities 
from infringing.134  The indigent sick were able to defeat this defense only 
by arguing necessity, 135 and thereby showing that charities had rightful 
access to the patented technology.136  However, that showing relied on facts 
that are virtually unique to essential medicines. 
To demonstrate the necessity of access to essential medicines, the 
indigent sick had to argue that essential medicines were either “necessary 
to protect the person . . . from serious harm,”137 or “necessary for the 
purpose of avoiding a public disaster.”138 Neither argument could be made 
in the vast majority of intellectual property settings.  The U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office has issued more than 8 million patents, and millions of 
those patents remain active today.139  Infringement of very few of those 
patents could be construed as necessary to prevent bodily harm or a public 
disaster.  Moreover, necessity applies to almost no copyrighted work or 
trademark. 
Even though necessity substantially confines a Prevented Rescue 
claim, the due process argument discussed in Part III, Section A. serves as 
 
134. See supra Part II.C.1 (“The Control of Property Defense is easily applied in the 
patent context. The drug companies can utilize the defense in the same way as the 
passerby whose rope was stole to save the life a drowning child. In short, a drug 
company would argue that there is no Prevented Rescue claim available, because 
the charity did not have the right to conduct its rescue activities in the first place.  
Because the drug company owned the patent to the technology, no charity can 
infringe the patent without prior permission from the drug company.”).    
135. See supra Part II.C.2 (“[T]he private necessity doctrine may be invoked to give 
charities the privilege to use patented medications that would otherwise require 
consent from the drug company.”). 
136. Id. 
137. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 263(1) (1965).  The Restatement mentions 
that private necessity will not apply if “the actor knows that the person for whose 
benefit he acts is unwilling that he shall do so,” but this will clearly not be the 
circumstance in any case resembling those discussed in this Part.  Any indigent 
sick person engaging in a lawsuit like the one discussed in this Part would only be 
doing so because she wanted the essential medicines made inaccessible to her by 
patent prices.). 
138. Id. § 262. The two issues are (1) whether a charity’s patent infringement would 
constitute an act that “would otherwise be a trespass to chattel or a conversion,” 
and (2) whether providing the indigent sick with essential medicines is an act that 
“is or is reasonably believed to be necessary for the purpose of avoiding a public 
disaster.”).  
139. Millions of Patents, THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (Oct. 
2, 2013, 10:00 AM), http://www.uspto.gov/news/Millions_of_Patents.jsp (“The 
U.S. Patent and Trademark office issued patent number 8,000,000 on August 16, 
2011.”). 
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another check on over-expansion.140  Even in the view of the von 
Eschenbach dissent, proving necessity or Prevented Rescue was not 
sufficient to find a fundamental right.141  As the dissent explained, “[a] 
tradition of protection does not alone establish a fundamental right.  The 
subsequent determination of whether a right is ‘implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty’ invalidates the . . . fears of a slippery slope.”142  Because 
access free access to copyrights, trademarks, and most patents is in no way 
“implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,” there need be no worry that the 
Prevented Rescue or necessity doctrines will require access to much more 
than essential medicines. 
2. Remaining Concerns 
Two other concerns are worth briefly considering: economic incentives 
and other parties implicated in the application of Prevented Rescue doctrine 
to drug companies.  First, economic incentives to develop essential 
medicines are not substantially hindered by allowing charities to provide 
essential medicines to the indigent sick.  The nature of the indigent sick 
discussed in this Note is that they cannot afford essential medications 
without someone infringing the patents of the drug companies.143  If the 
indigent sick had access to the essential medicines otherwise, they could 
not argue that infringing the patents of the drug companies is necessary to 
obtain access to the medicines.144  Thus, drug companies will lose little to 
no profits by being forced to allow limited infringement.145  Thus, the 
incentives to develop are not noticeably harmed. 
The second issue concerns parties that might be implicated, along with 
the drug companies, by the Prevented Rescue theory.  The drug companies’ 
business partners might have reason for concern but so might the U.S. 
 
140. See supra Part III.A (discussing Abigail Alliance for Better Access to 
Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach and the dissent’s reasoning for 
accepting the Prevented Rescue argument as a strong indicator of a fundamental 
right).  
141. See Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. von 
Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695, 718 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (Roger, J., dissenting) (“A 
tradition of protection does not alone establish a fundamental right. The 
subsequent determination of whether a right is ‘implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty’ invalidates the court’s fears of a slippery slope.”). 
142. Id. 
143. See supra Part II.A (discussing the indigent sick’s ability to bring a tort claim 
under the Prevented Rescue Theory). 
144. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 326 (1965) (“One who intentionally 
prevents a third person from giving to another aid necessary to prevent physical 
harm to him, is subject to liability for physical harm caused to the other by the 
absence of the aid which he has prevented the third person from giving.”). 
145. See supra text accompanying note 95 (“[I]t could be argued that there is no 
damage done because the indigent sick would not have been able to afford the 
essential medicines regardless; that the defining characteristic that qualifies them 
as indigent sick. Thus, there can be no lost profits to the drug companies.”). 
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federal government.146  Just like Abigail Alliance for Better Access to 
Developmental Drugs v. von Eschenbach questioned the actions of the 
FDA,147 another action might challenge the PTO’s granting carte blanche 
patent rights on essential medicines.148  Nonetheless, the government has 
unique defenses available to it that do not apply to the drug companies.  
Exploring these defenses is beyond the scope of this Note. 
CONCLUSION 
In a developed country, where residents go without the drugs they 
need, something must be done.  This Note considered one solution for the 
indigent sick that cannot afford their essential medications: sue drug 
companies that both vigorously enforce their patents and sell their drugs at 
such high prices that poor Americans are forced to go without the drugs.  
One unique aspect of this argument is that it does not demand any positive 
action from the drug companies.  Instead, the tort claim argues that drug 
must companies merely refrain from preventing others that attempt to save 
the indigent sick. 
The prevented rescue theory considered in this Note started strong.  A 
prima facie case for liability was made and the only generally applicable 
defense could not withstand critique.  Nonetheless, by arguing preemption, 
the drug companies prevailed over the plaintiffs.  Statutory patent law 
specifically grants the drug companies the authority to prevent rescues, 
even though tort law would have otherwise supported a finding of liability. 
Although patent law prevents the indigent sick from asserting a 
prevented rescue claim, the indigent sick have two alternatives.  First, state 
tort law is an important tool in determining what constitutes a fundamental 
right that the substantive due process clause protects.  By demonstrating 
that, were it not for preemption, the drug companies would be liable under 
state tort law, this Note supports a finding of a fundamental right that 
overrides statutory patent law.149  Second, the applicability of state tort law 
to the actions promoted by federal patent law should give legislators pause 
to think.  The strength of this point is bolstered by the public policy 
considerations addressed in this Note.  Creating an exception modeled off 
 
146. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2006) (stating that the patent system is a federal creation 
and patent law is subject to exclusive federal jurisdiction). 
147. Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d 695, 697 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
148. See id. (finding that an FDA policy did not constitute a tort of intentionally 
preventing a person from giving necessary aid to another); see also United States 
v. Lawter, 219 F.2d 559, 562 (5th Cir. 1955) (holding that the federal government 
is liable when it prevents others from attempting a rescue and takes no action 
itself). 
149. The manner in which the Prevented Rescue claim was preempted remains 
important when considering due process.  The prevented rescue theory conflicts 
with statutory patent law, not the Constitution.  Therefore, despite the existence of 
conflicting statutory patent law, the due process clause claim remains can 
succeed. 
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of the concerns raise in this Note with increase access to essential 
medication without noticeably impacting the incentives to further create 
such medicines. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
